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Optimal decentralized management of a natural resource

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  • Sébastien Rouillon

    (GREThA - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée - UB - Université de Bordeaux - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We construct an economic mechanism to realize in Nash equilibrium an optimal consumption time path of a natural resource. For exposition convenience, the analysis is conducted within the model initiated by Levhari and Mirman (1980). This framework allows us to explicitly calculate the consumption time paths of the resource, associated with an open-access regime, with a cooperative management and with a (stationary Markovian) Nash equilibrium of the di¤erence game induced by the proposed mechanism.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Sébastien Rouillon, 2010. "Optimal decentralized management of a natural resource," Post-Print hal-00798341, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00798341
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    Cited by:

    1. Rodrigo Harrison & Roger Lagunoff, 2017. "Dynamic Mechanism Design For A Global Commons," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(3), pages 751-782, August.
    2. Rodrigo Harrison & Roger Lagunoff, 2015. "Tipping Points and Business-as-Usual in a Global Carbon Commons," Documentos de Trabajo 458, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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