Give me a chance ! An experiment in social decision under risk
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Other versions of this item:
- Michal Krawczyk & Fabrice Le Lec, 2010. "‘Give me a chance!’ An experiment in social decision under risk," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 13(4), pages 500-511, December.
References listed on IDEAS
- Edi Karni & Tim Salmon & Barry Sopher, 2008.
"Individual sense of fairness: an experimental study,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 11(2), pages 174-189, June.
- Barry Sopher & Edi Karni & Tim Salmon, 2001. "Individual Sense of Fairness: An Experimental Study," Departmental Working Papers 200107, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Brennan, Geoffrey & González, Luis G. & Güth, Werner & Levati, M. Vittoria, 2008.
"Attitudes toward private and collective risk in individual and strategic choice situations,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 253-262, July.
- Geoffrey Brennan & Werner Güth & Luis G. Gonzalez & M. Vittoria Levati, 2005. "Attitudes toward Private and Collective Risks in Individual and Strategic Choice Situations," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-22, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Simon Gächter & Arno Riedl, 2005.
"Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with Infeasible Claims,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(2), pages 249-263, February.
- Simon Gächter & Arno Riedl, 2003. "Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with Infeasible Claims," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-055/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Jason Dana & Roberto Weber & Jason Kuang, 2007. "Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 33(1), pages 67-80, October.
- Steffen Andersen & Glenn Harrison & Morten Lau & E. Rutström, 2009. "Elicitation using multiple price list formats," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 12(3), pages 365-366, September.
More about this item
KeywordsSocial preferences; Other-regarding preferences; Inequity aversion; Social concern; Social preferences under risk; Procedural fairness;
- A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
- C65 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Miscellaneous Mathematical Tools
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
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