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The newsvendor game has a non-empty core

Author

Listed:
  • Marco Scarsini

    () (GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Aziendali - LUISS - Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali Guido Carli [Roma])

  • Alfred Muller
  • Moshe Shaked

Abstract

We settle an open conjecture regarding the newsvendor game. We prove that its core is always non-empty, for all possible joint distributions of the random demands. We give sufficient conditions under which the core is a singleton or it contains non-negative elements.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Scarsini & Alfred Muller & Moshe Shaked, 2002. "The newsvendor game has a non-empty core," Post-Print hal-00539841, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00539841 DOI: 10.1006/game.2001.0854 Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00539841
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gary D. Eppen, 1979. "Note--Effects of Centralization on Expected Costs in a Multi-Location Newsboy Problem," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(5), pages 498-501, May.
    2. Finkelshtain, Israel & Kella, Offer & Scarsini, Marco, 1999. "On risk aversion with two risks," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 239-250, March.
    3. Hartman, Bruce C. & Dror, Moshe & Shaked, Moshe, 2000. "Cores of Inventory Centralization Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 26-49, April.
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    Keywords

    cost allocation; inventory centralization; core;

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