Financial Disclosure and the Board: Is Independence of Directors Always Efficient
In listed companies, the Board of directors is the ultimate responsible of information disclosure. The "conventional wisdom" considers independence of directors as the essential attribute to improve the quality of that disclosure. In a sense, this approach subordinates expertise to independence. However, effective certification may require finn-specific expertise, in particular for intangible-intensive business models. However, this latter form of expertise is negatively related to independence as it is commonly measured and evaluated. We show that there exists an optimal share of independent directors for each company, related to the magnitude of intangible resources.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published - Presented, Forum de la Regulation 2009, 2009, Paris, France|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00442767/en/|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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