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Financial Disclosure and the Board: Is Independence of Directors Always Efficient

Author

Listed:
  • Antoine Reberioux

    (EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Yuri Biondi

    () (CERAG - Centre d'études et de recherches appliquées à la gestion - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PREG - Pole de recherche en économie et gestion - Polytechnique - X - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Giannoccolo Pierpaolo

    () (dpt of Economics - Université de Bologne)

Abstract

In listed companies, the Board of directors is the ultimate responsible of information disclosure. The "conventional wisdom" considers independence of directors as the essential attribute to improve the quality of that disclosure. In a sense, this approach subordinates expertise to independence. However, effective certification may require finn-specific expertise, in particular for intangible-intensive business models. However, this latter form of expertise is negatively related to independence as it is commonly measured and evaluated. We show that there exists an optimal share of independent directors for each company, related to the magnitude of intangible resources.

Suggested Citation

  • Antoine Reberioux & Yuri Biondi & Giannoccolo Pierpaolo, 2009. "Financial Disclosure and the Board: Is Independence of Directors Always Efficient," Post-Print hal-00442767, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00442767 Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00442767
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    References listed on IDEAS

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