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Financial Disclosure and the Board: Is Independence of Directors Always Efficient

  • Antoine Reberioux

    (EconomiX - CNRS - UP10 - Université Paris 10, Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense)

  • Yuri Biondi


    (CERAG - Centre d'études et de recherches appliquées à la gestion - Grenoble 2 UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - CNRS, PREG - Pole de recherche en économie et gestion - Polytechnique - X - CNRS)

  • Giannoccolo Pierpaolo


    (dpt of Economics - Université de Bologne)

In listed companies, the Board of directors is the ultimate responsible of information disclosure. The "conventional wisdom" considers independence of directors as the essential attribute to improve the quality of that disclosure. In a sense, this approach subordinates expertise to independence. However, effective certification may require finn-specific expertise, in particular for intangible-intensive business models. However, this latter form of expertise is negatively related to independence as it is commonly measured and evaluated. We show that there exists an optimal share of independent directors for each company, related to the magnitude of intangible resources.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00442767.

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Date of creation: 02 Dec 2009
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Forum de la Regulation 2009, Dec 2009, Paris, France.,%20GIANNOCCOLO,%20REBERIOUX.pdf, 2009
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00442767
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