IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-00428918.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Pleasure and belief in Hume's decision process

Author

Listed:
  • Marc-Arthur Diaye

    () (Centre d'Etude de l'Emploi - UEVE - Université d'Évry-Val-d'Essonne)

  • André Lapidus

    () (PHARE - Pôle d'Histoire de l'Analyse et des Représentations Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to introduce explicitly pleasure and belief in what aims at being a Humean theory of decision, like the one developed in Diaye and Lapidus (2005a). Although we support the idea that Hume was in some way – evidently different from Bentham's or Jevons' way – a hedonist, we lay emphasis less on continuity than on the specific kind of hedonism encountered in Hume's writings (chiefly the Treatise, the second Enquiry, the Dissertation, or some of his Essays). Such hedonism clearly contrasts to its standard modern inheritance, expressed by the relation between preferences and utility. The reason for such a difference with the usual approach lies in the mental process that Hume puts to the fore in order to explain the way pleasure determines desires and volition. Whereas pleasure is primarily, in Hume's words, an impression of sensation, it takes place in the birth of passions as reflecting an idea of pleasure, whose “force and vivacity” is precisely a “belief”, transferred to the direct passions of desire or volition which come immediately before action. As a result, from a Humean point of view, “belief” deals as well with decision under risk or uncertainty, as with intertemporal decision and indiscrimination problems. The latter are explored within a formal framework, and it is shown that the relation of pleasure is transformed by belief into a relation of desire, which belongs to a non-empty class of relations, among which at least one is a preorder.

Suggested Citation

  • Marc-Arthur Diaye & André Lapidus, 2009. "Pleasure and belief in Hume's decision process," Post-Print hal-00428918, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00428918
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-paris1.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00428918
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal-paris1.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00428918/document
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Marc-Arthur Diaye & Andre Lapidus, 2005. "A Humean theory of choice of which rationality may be one consequence," The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(1), pages 89-111.
    2. Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, 2003. "Time-Inconsistent Preferences in Adam Smith and David Hume," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 35(2), pages 241-268, Summer.
    3. Gordon F. Davis, 2003. "Philosophical Psychology and Economic Psychology in David Hume and Adam Smith," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 35(2), pages 269-304, Summer.
    4. Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, 2003. "Time-Inconsistent Preferences in Adam Smith and David Hume," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 35(2), pages 241-268, Summer.
    5. Andre Lapidus, 2010. "The valuation of decision and individual welfare: a Humean approach," The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(1), pages 1-28.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Laurie Bréban & André Lapidus, 2013. "Adam Smith on lotteries: an interpretation and formal restatement," Working Papers hal-00914222, HAL.
    2. Marc-Arthur Diaye & André Lapidus, 2016. "Decision and Time from a Humean Point of View," Working Papers hal-01372527, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Hume; decision; pleasure; belief; passion; desire; preference; rationality; discrimination; will; choice;

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00428918. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.