Standards of behavior and time generate tacit cooperation in hierarchical relationship
This paper provides a game theoritic rationale for the use of standards of behavior in hierarchies. lt proves that the common knowledge of such standards in a long term relationship generates tacit cooperation as long as the time horizon is far enough and that intermediary observations are feasible. Though mathematically similar to the well known equation effect it is argued that the observed result is more robust with respect to the players incentive to view their relationship through such a formalization.
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|Date of creation:||1992|
|Publication status:||Published in Annales d'Economie et Statistiques, 1992, 25/26, pp.251-263|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00363941|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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