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Merit, approbation and the evolution of social structure

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  • Robin Cowan

    (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UNU-MERIT - UNU-MERIT - United Nations University - Maastricht University)

  • Nicolas Jonard

    (Uni.lu - Université du Luxembourg)

Abstract

We examine a society in which individuals gain utility from income and social approbation. Approbation is given to an unobservable trait, signalled through social mobility. Two environments are studied: in one players care for absolute approbation; in the other relative approbation matters. In both environments, individuals' quest for approbation both affects and is affected by social structure. We study the long run implications of that interaction on social organization. Various forms of dynasties and meritocracies are possible. Even though social mobility is driven purely by meritocratic principles, pure dynasties can emerge.

Suggested Citation

  • Robin Cowan & Nicolas Jonard, 2005. "Merit, approbation and the evolution of social structure," Post-Print hal-00279263, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00279263
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2006.11.005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Tacsir, Ezequiel, 2010. "Occupation Choice: Family, Social and Market Influences," MERIT Working Papers 2010-013, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).

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