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Equilibria in Non-Cooperative Game II: Deviations Based Refinements of N ash Equilibrium


  • Sadanand, A.
  • Sadanand, V.


In any Nash equilibrium no player will unilaterally deviate. However, many games have multiple Nash equilibria. In this paper, we survey some refinements of Nash equilibria based on the hypothesis that any player may consider a deliberate deviation from a Nash equilibrium vector while expecting other players to respond optimally to this deviation. The concepts studied here differ in the expectations players have about other players' responses to a deviation. This sort of deviations philosophy is predicated on the thought process of players. Therefore, the validity of a particular equilibrium concept to an economic model may depend upon the relevance of the thought process implied by the concept. Copyright 1995 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research
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Suggested Citation

  • Sadanand, A. & Sadanand, V., 1992. "Equilibria in Non-Cooperative Game II: Deviations Based Refinements of N ash Equilibrium," Working Papers 1992-10, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
  • Handle: RePEc:gue:guelph:1992-10

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    economic equilibrium ; game theory;


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