IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/gre/wpaper/2024-29.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

La rationalité économique de la distinction ex post / ex ante en matière de concurrence et de régulation dans le secteur numérique

Author

Listed:
  • Frédéric Marty

    (Université Côte d'Azur, France
    GREDEG CNRS)

Abstract

L'articulation entre interventions ex ante et ex post dans le cadre de l'encadrement européen des marchés numériques peut se concevoir de trois façons. La première est relative à la temporalité de l'exercice des contrôles concurrentiels, comme le montre le cas du contrôle des concentrations entre mécanisme de notification ex ante et possibilité de contrôle ex post. La deuxième porte sur les modalités d'application des règles de concurrence. Doivent-elles reposer sur des règles définies ex ante ou résulter d'une balance des effets ex post ? La troisième que nous considérons dans ce texte est celui de l'articulation entre interventions réglementaires et activation des règles de concurrence. Nous considérons cette question sous l'angle de l'économie du droit dans un contexte spécifique, celui de l'articulation entre les différents règlements européens relatifs au secteur numérique et du droit antitrust de l'U.E.

Suggested Citation

  • Frédéric Marty, 2024. "La rationalité économique de la distinction ex post / ex ante en matière de concurrence et de régulation dans le secteur numérique," GREDEG Working Papers 2024-29, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
  • Handle: RePEc:gre:wpaper:2024-29
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://195.220.190.85/GREDEG-WP-2024-29.pdf
    File Function: First version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    économie numérique; régulation; règles de concurrence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gre:wpaper:2024-29. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Patrice Bougette (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/credcfr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.