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Jeux de coalitions et oligopoles

Author

Listed:
  • Aymeric Lardon

    (Université Côte d'Azur, France
    GREDEG CNRS)

Abstract

Cet article est une revue de littérature concernant les jeux de coalitions appliqués aux oligopoles. Le coeur est un concept de solution approprié sur cette classe de jeux pour traiter la question de la stabilité des accords collusifs entre les entreprises. L'objectif de cet article est de proposer une typologie des marchés oligopolistiques afin de mettre en perspective les différentes contributions de l'étude sur le coeur. Tout au long de notre exposé, nous mettrons en évidence les conditions nécessaires ou suffisantes (cadre de concurrence, taille du marché, hétérogénéité des coûts, transfert de technologies, règles de blocage...) pour qu'un accord collusif stable existe.

Suggested Citation

  • Aymeric Lardon, 2016. "Jeux de coalitions et oligopoles," GREDEG Working Papers 2016-28, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis.
  • Handle: RePEc:gre:wpaper:2016-28
    as

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    File URL: http://www.gredeg.cnrs.fr/working-papers/GREDEG-WP-2016-28.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2016
    Download Restriction: no

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Jeux de coalitions; Oligopoles; Accord collusif; Coeur; Balancement; Convexité;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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