As-Efficient Competitor Test in Exclusionary Prices Strategies: Does Post-Danmark Really Pave the Way towards a More Economic Approach?
The Post Danmark judgment may cast the light on the interpretations by the EU Court of Justice of crucial dimensions of the competition policy as: selective price cuts, above-cost rebates, costs test for exclusionary abuses with common costs. As we see one of the main interests of the decision lies on the cost criteria used by the Court to determine if a given price practice may exclude a competitor as efficient as the incumbent. In other words, does Post Danmark constitutes a real step towards the appropriation by the Court of Justice of the more economic approach promoted by the Commission and, more broadly, is really the logic of the Court coherent with an effects-based approach? Does Post Danmark conciliates the traditional decisional practice of the Court with the new principles of competition policy enforcement advocated by the Commission since the issuance of its February 2009 guidelines, relative to the exclusionary practices of dominant undertakings?
|Date of creation:||Jul 2013|
|Date of revision:||Mar 2014|
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