IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

As-Efficient Competitor Test in Exclusionary Prices Strategies: Does Post-Danmark Really Pave the Way towards a More Economic Approach?


  • Frédéric Marty

    University of Nice Sophia Antipolis
    OFCE - Sciences Po. Paris)


The Post Danmark judgment may cast the light on the interpretations by the EU Court of Justice of crucial dimensions of the competition policy as: selective price cuts, above-cost rebates, costs test for exclusionary abuses with common costs. As we see one of the main interests of the decision lies on the cost criteria used by the Court to determine if a given price practice may exclude a competitor as efficient as the incumbent. In other words, does Post Danmark constitutes a real step towards the appropriation by the Court of Justice of the more economic approach promoted by the Commission and, more broadly, is really the logic of the Court coherent with an effects-based approach? Does Post Danmark conciliates the traditional decisional practice of the Court with the new principles of competition policy enforcement advocated by the Commission since the issuance of its February 2009 guidelines, relative to the exclusionary practices of dominant undertakings?

Suggested Citation

  • Frédéric Marty, 2013. "As-Efficient Competitor Test in Exclusionary Prices Strategies: Does Post-Danmark Really Pave the Way towards a More Economic Approach?," GREDEG Working Papers 2013-26, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France, revised Mar 2014.
  • Handle: RePEc:gre:wpaper:2013-26

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    File Function: Revised version, 2014
    Download Restriction: no

    More about this item


    exclusionary practices; abuse of dominant position; predatory pricing; as-efficient competitor test;

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
    • L97 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Utilities: General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gre:wpaper:2013-26. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Patrice Bougette). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.