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Misaligned Stakeholders and Health System Underperformance

Author

Listed:
  • David E. Bloom

    (Harvard T. H. Chan School of Public Health)

  • Daniel M. Cadarette

    (Harvard T. H. Chan School of Public Health)

  • Jonty Roland

    (KPMG)

  • Jessica Sullivan

    (Harvard T. H. Chan School of Public Health)

Abstract

This paper summarizes the findings of the World Economic Forum’s Industry Agenda Council on the Future of the Health Sector’s two-year inquiry into underperformance of health systems. The Council found that misalignments (i.e., situations involving conflicting incentives, behaviour, structures, or policies) among key stakeholders are likely to lead to significant waste, whether measured in terms of health for money or money for health. This paper defines three types of misalignments (those due to divergent objectives, power asymmetries, and cooperation failures), offers concrete examples of each type, and includes several cross-cutting examples from three particularly burdensome disease areas: cancer, diabetes, and mental health. The Council also examined situations in which stakeholders acted to correct misalignments and reduce waste. This paper details several case studies of achieving greater alignment and enumerates a set of lessons for stakeholders. It concludes by making recommendations for future research in this domain. JEL Codes: D47, D49, I11

Suggested Citation

  • David E. Bloom & Daniel M. Cadarette & Jonty Roland & Jessica Sullivan, 2017. "Misaligned Stakeholders and Health System Underperformance," PGDA Working Papers 13417, Program on the Global Demography of Aging.
  • Handle: RePEc:gdm:wpaper:13417
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    File URL: https://cdn1.sph.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/1288/2012/11/WEF_White_Paper_Misaligned_Stakeholders_Health_System_Underperformance_report_2016.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Misalignment; alignment; incentives; health; healthcare; divergent objectives; power asymmetries; cooperation failures;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D49 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Other
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets

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