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Collusion et structure des coûts dans un marché de duopole mixte vs privé de téléphonie mobile

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  • Sami Debbichi

    (AEDD, University of Tunis El Manar)

  • Walid Hichri

    (Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne,F-69130 Ecully, France)

Abstract

Nous présentons dans ce papier une modélisation du seuil critique de préférence pour la collusion dans un duopole mixte/privé en fonction du tarif d’interconnexion et de son coût marginal, dans un régime de concurrence à la Cournot. L’objectif consiste à comparer la préférence pour la collusion à travers ce seuil dans les deux structures de marché étudiées et dans deux cas de figures : coûts d’interconnexion linéaires et coût d’interconnexion quadratiques. Les résultats montrent que le seuil dépend de deux variables : Le tarif d’interconnexion et un paramètre relatif à la technologie employée par l’opérateur. Les résultats de l’application au cas du marché Tunisien sont conformes aux résultats théoriques.

Suggested Citation

  • Sami Debbichi & Walid Hichri, 2013. "Collusion et structure des coûts dans un marché de duopole mixte vs privé de téléphonie mobile," Working Papers 1319, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
  • Handle: RePEc:gat:wpaper:1319
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    Cited by:

    1. Ummad Mazhar & Cheick Kader M'Baye, 2014. "Does Forecasts Transparency Affect Macroeconomic Volatility in Developing Countries ? Evidence From Quasi-Natural Experiments," Working Papers halshs-00956454, HAL.
    2. Sami Debbichi & Walid Hichri, 2014. "Market Power and Collusion on Interconnection Phone Market in Tunisia : What Lessons from International Experiences," Working Papers 1411, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    3. repec:ipg:wpaper:2014-580 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Collusion; Structure des coûts; Marché Mixte;

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

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