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Wage bargaining with non-stationary preferences under strike decision

Author

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  • Ahmet Ozkardas

    () (Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69003, France; CNRS, GATE, UMR 5824, Ecully, F-69130, France)

  • Agnieszka Rusinowska

    () (Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69003, France; CNRS, GATE, UMR 5824, Ecully, F-69130, France)

Abstract

In this paper, we present a non-cooperative wage bargaining model in which preferences of both parties, a union and a firm, are expressed by the sequences of discount rates varying in time. For such a wage bargaining with non-stationary preferences, we determine subgame perfect equilibria between the union and the firm for the case when the union is supposed to go on strike in each period in which there is a disagreement. A certain generalization of the original Rubinstein bargaining model is applied to determine these equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2009. "Wage bargaining with non-stationary preferences under strike decision," Working Papers 0930, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
  • Handle: RePEc:gat:wpaper:0930
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    Keywords

    union - firm bargaining; alternating offers; varying discount rates; subgame perfection;

    JEL classification:

    • J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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