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Military economy and military reform in Russia


  • Zatsepin Vasily

    (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy)

  • Tsymbal Vitaly

    (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy)


The number of Russian Armed Forces (RFAF) authorized strength at year-end 2017 increased 17,387 to 1,903,758 on the back of disbandment of the Federal Special Construction Agency (Spetsstroy); therefore, the RFAF’s total authorized strength rose to 1,013,628 from 1 million.[1] That was the first time when data on RFAF’s authorized war strength (1,700,000) were published by mass media, posting a substantial decrease from 5 million reported prior to the military reform of 2008-2012.The Russian Defense Ministry did not publish 2017 year-end service personnel statistics like it did in previous years; therefore, the total accountable strength presumably decreased to 240,000 from previous year’s 270,000 as a result of a 35,000 (13 percent) decline in the number of conscript personnel. Overall, the 2017 total number of conscript personnel inflow stood at 276,000, or 31,000 (10 percent) less than in 2016 .

Suggested Citation

  • Zatsepin Vasily & Tsymbal Vitaly, 2018. "Military economy and military reform in Russia," Published Papers ppaper-2018-316, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, revised 2018.
  • Handle: RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2018-316

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    More about this item


    Russian economy; military-industrial complex; military reform; defense order; military procurement; defense control;

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • F52 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - National Security; Economic Nationalism
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions

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