Rebuilding The Democracy Of The Taxpayer
The voter - bureaucrat is locked into a situation of a conflict of interests: as a conscientious citizen, he or she should support optimal expenditure levels for providing certain public goods, but as a person whose wellbeing and career depend on the volume of expenditures for providing public goods, he or she is interested in supporting volumes and prices which obviously exceed the levels acceptable for most citizens of the state. The bureaucrat is also interested in obtaining excess control and regulatory empowerment and authorization. It follows that a conscientious and enlightened functionary should submit a statement about a conflict of interests, and abstain from voting until retirement or demotion. A large and growing group of voters is made up of “professional” recipients of aid. It follows that persons, whose interests include the redistribution of resources of the taxpayers in their own favor, also have no moral right to make decisions by voting during elections. This applies in part also to those entrepreneurs who derive most of their income from the budget. Another grounding factor is the historical statistics of state budget balancing (the dynamics of state debt) and inflation (see Appendix 4: The History of Inflation and Budgetary Deficit after the Introduction of Universal Suffrage). In the age before universal suffrage, problems of financing were almost always an outcome of military cataclysms or other external shocks of a similar magnitude. In the age of universal suffrage, budgetary deficit, growing state debt, and inflation have become the norm.
|Date of creation:||2013|
|Date of revision:||2013|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 3-5 Gazetny lane, Moscow, 125009|
Phone: (495) 629-6413
Fax: (495) 203-8816
Web page: http://iep.ru/en.html
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Barro, Robert J., 1974.
"Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?,"
3451399, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Stigler, George J, 1970. "Director's Law of Public Income Redistribution," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(1), pages 1-10, April.
- Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2009.
"Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671422, May.
- James Gwartney & Randal Holcombe & Robert Lawson, 1998. "The Scope of Government and the Wealth of Nations," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 18(2), pages 163-190, Fall.
- Leonid Polishchuk & Alexei Savvateev, 2004. "Spontaneous (non)emergence of property rights," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 12(1), pages 103-127, 03.
- Aidt, T.S. & Dutta, Jayasri & Loukoianova, Elena, 2006. "Democracy comes to Europe: Franchise extension and fiscal outcomes 1830-1938," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 249-283, February.
- Smith, Vernon L, 1980. "Experiments with a Decentralized Mechanism for Public Good Decisions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(4), pages 584-599, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gai:ppaper:140. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Victor Hugues)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.