Endogenous Formation of Competitive Research Sharing Joint Ventures
Research joint ventures may coordinate research investments or improve research sharing. When research joint venture partners only share R&D results, large consortia are more profitable than small ones, and joint ventures prefer their rivals dispersed. According to a coalition formation game, an oligopoly partitions itself asymmetrically into two or three coalitions for a wide range of parameter values.
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