A Median Voter Model of Health Insurance with Ex Post Moral Hazard
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- Simona GRASSI, 2006. "On the characteristics of a mixed system of provision of a private good. An application to health care," Departmental Working Papers 2006-14, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
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KeywordsHEALTH INSURANCE ; MORAL HAZARD ; VOTERS;
- H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
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