IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

The Success and Survival of Cautious Optimism - An Evolutionary Analysis of Pre-Trial Settlement Negotiations

Listed author(s):
  • Bar-Gill, O.
Registered author(s):

    The systematic optimism of lawyers is even more of a puzzle. A lawyer suffering from a persistent problem of inaccurate assessments will surely be driven out of the market. The present analysis challenges these conventional allegations. Using evolutionary game theory, we demonstrate that `market pressure`, or an alternative imitation process, favor cautiously optimistic litigants. The pre-trial environment, inspired by the legal system, fosters optimism through the mechanism of settlement negotiations. We study a dynamic model, which allows us to derive the evolutionary stable level of optimism, under different legal regimes. Our analysis emphasizes the major role of the prevailing legal rule in determining the equilibrium level of optimism. By doing so we hope to shed new light on the ongoing debate regarding the effects of legal rules on the probability of settlement.

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Paper provided by Tel Aviv in its series Papers with number 2000-15.

    in new window

    Length: 29 pages
    Date of creation: 2000
    Handle: RePEc:fth:teavfo:2000-15
    Contact details of provider: Postal:

    Phone: 972-3-640-9255
    Fax: 972-3-640-5815
    Web page:

    More information through EDIRC

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:teavfo:2000-15. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.