Should Products Liability Be Based on Hindsight?
In designing and marketing new products, manufacturers face uncertainty regarding the harmful character of their products. If harm occurs due to a defective design, liability is imposed on manufacturers whenever the design of the product is determined to be unreasonably dangerous. In assessing the reasonableness of a design, courts often - although the doctrine is not settled - admit information which was acquired throughout the actual usage of the product - information that often was not scientifically available at the time of production. The Asbestos litigation is a prominent example of this practice. This paper examines the incentive effects of such hindsight.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1997|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Israel TEL-AVIV UNIVERSITY, THE FOERDER INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, RAMAT AVIV 69 978 TEL AVIV ISRAEL.|
Web page: http://econ.tau.ac.il/foerder/about
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:teavfo:14-97. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.