Money Growth Targeting
The recent debate over monetary policy strategies concludes that monetary targeting in practice lead to very similar patterns of central bank behaviour. This raises the question why central banks insist on the strategies they use. In this paper, we develop an answer from political economy. After showing that closed-loop monetary strategies using similar information sets imply that similar monetary policy performance, we argue that monetary strategies are helpful in solving internal and external coordination problems for the central bank. We illustrate the point by reviewing the Bundesbank's introduction of monetary targeting in the mid-1970s.
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|Date of creation:||1998|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: UNIVERSITY OF STOCKHOLM, INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC STUDIES, S- 106 91 STOCKHOLM SWEDEN.|
Web page: http://www.iies.su.se/
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