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Ownership and Theories of the Firm : Some Missing Links Revealed by Privatization in Transition Economies

Author

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  • Nivet, J.-F.

Abstract

This paper provides a precise and critical rereading of theories, developed before the 1990s, able to justify why privatization has been considered as a central component of transition in post-socialist countries, mainly the theory of property rights, managerial theories of the firm, the positive theory of agency. It highlights their difficulties to fully explain the inefficiency of state enterprises and the superiority of private corporations. It concludes on theoretical missing links, pertaining to the role of state, incompleteness of contracts, laws, uncertainty and entrepreneurship.

Suggested Citation

  • Nivet, J.-F., 2001. "Ownership and Theories of the Firm : Some Missing Links Revealed by Privatization in Transition Economies," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications 2001.08, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:pariem:2001.08
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    Cited by:

    1. Gouret, Fabian, 2007. "Privatization and output behavior during the transition: Methods matter!," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 3-34, March.
    2. Fabian Gouret, 2003. "Méthodes de privatisation et évolution de l'output dans les économies en transition," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques j04028, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    PRIVATIZATION ; OWNERSHIP ; PROPERTY RIGHTS ; EXTERNALITIES;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
    • P5 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems

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