Privatization with Political Constraint: Auctions versus Private Negotiations
This paper investigates the design of privatization mechanisms in emerging market economies. We identify an emerging market economy by the political constraints that limit the set of viable privatization mechanisms. Our objective is to explain the striking diversity of privatization mechanisms observed in practice and the frequent use of an apparantly suboptimal
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|Date of creation:||15 Apr 1997|
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- Baldwin, Carliss Y. & Bhattacharyya, Sugato, 1991. "Choosing the method of sale *1: A clinical study of Conrail," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 69-98, November.
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