Jusges and CEOs: Aspects of French Corporate Governance
The debate about corporate governance has brought to the front stage the notion of 'social interest' or interest of the company itself as distinct of its stakeholders. French Law, judges, and CEOs use this notion with different meanings and intentions. Shareholders and company interest do not merge. They differ on the industrial relations policy they induce and in the management freedom bestowed on CEOs. A reform of French Company Law currently under discussion seeks conciliation while trying to comply with the principles of corporate governance best practices.
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|Date of creation:||1999|
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