Executive Control, Performance and Compensation in French Firms
The paper introduces first the legal framework as it has been developed by French jurisprudence which distinguishes the social interest of the firm from the interest of all stakeholders. Then, it presents the monitoring of executives in several fields, commodity markets, the financial market, stock exchange and evaluates the different means of control and incentives. In the second part, French data relative to stakeholders and boards are scrutinised.
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|Date of creation:||1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: France; Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire de recherche sur le ressources humaines et l'emploi (LIRHE). Universite des sciences sociales - bat. J - Place Anatole-France - 31042 Toulouse Cedex|
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