IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fth/indgan/148.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Capacity, Entry and Demand Uncertainty

Author

Listed:
  • Poddar, S.

Abstract

In a a two period model of strategic entry deterrence (a la Dixit, 1980) where the incumbent firm moves before the entrant by installing capacity for production, in a (perfect) equilibrium excess capacity is not observed under a deterministic demand. The question whether this result remains valid under demand uncertainty is analyzed. It has been shown that the result of holding no excess capacity may not hold when there is a demand uncertainty. In connection to this, the other relevant issue that is also analyzed in this paper, is to see the impact of the distribution of demand uncertainty on uncumbent's decision, when it faces the choice to deter or accomodate the potential entrant.

Suggested Citation

  • Poddar, S., 1998. "Capacity, Entry and Demand Uncertainty," Papers 148, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research-.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:indgan:148
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Arijit Mukherjee, 2002. "Capacity Commitment and Licensing," Industrial Organization 0211004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Aniruddha Bagchi & Arijit Mukherjee, 2011. "Commitment and excess capacity with licensing: an old debate with a new look," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 103(2), pages 133-147, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    OLIGOPOLIES ; STRATEGIC PLANNING ; MARKETS STRUCTURES;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:indgan:148. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thomas Krichel (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/igidrin.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.