Coase Contracts and the Producer's Incentive to Innovate
The paper analyzes the dynamic efficiency of the Coase solution to the problem of negative externalities. We demonstrate that with respect to the incentive of the producer to develop or to adopt a superior technology the so-called "symmetry thesis" does not hold for all types of contracts.
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|Date of creation:||1998|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Technical University Bergakademie Freiberg, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration. Gustav-Zeuner-Str.8, D-09596 Freiberg.|
Web page: http://tu-freiberg.de/fakult6
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