The Nonorthodox Currency Boards: The Case of Bulgaria
In recent years a number of countries have introduced currency boards (CB). The new generation currency boards, which is gaining swing and popularity, preserves to different degrees the central bank's ability to perform the lender of last resort function (LOLR) and leaves room for intervention in case of systemic risk. Central bank flexibility was preserved in different forms in HongKong, Argentina, Estonia, Lithuania and Bulgaria. The major questions that need answers are: (1) which are the new channels of monetary policy; (2) does an orthodox self-regulating mechanism work with second generation currency boards; (3) how are disequilibria in the economy adjusted? The theoretical hypotheses presented are checked empirically based on Bulgarian data.
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|Date of creation:||2001|
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