Players' Information in Extensive Games
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- Giacomo Bonanno & Cédric Dégremont, 2013. "Logic and Game Theory," Working Papers 135, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Quesada, Antonio, 2001. "On expressing maximum information in extensive games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 161-167, September.
- Giacomo Bonanno, 2009. "A characterization of sequential equilibrium in terms of AGM belief revision," Working Papers 914, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
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Keywordsgame theory ; economic models;
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