Cost and Quantity Invcentives in Health Care: Altruistic Providers
This paper compares the cost and quality incentive effects of cost reimbursement and prospective payment systems in the health industru when providers are altuistic. Provider's behavioral rule is governed by a desire to maximize a weighted sum of profit and consumers' health benefit.
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|Date of creation:||1998|
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