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Keeping People Out: Income Distribution, Zoning and the Quality of Public Education

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  • Fernandez, R.
  • Rogerson, R.

Abstract

This paper examines the effect of community zoning regulations on allocations and welfare in a two-community model. Each community uses a local property tax to finance public education. Tax rates are determined by majority vote within each community, and individuals choose in which community to reside. We study exogenously imposed zoning regulations as well as the case where the regulator is endogenously determined by majority vote. Our analysis indicates that a number of outcomes are theoretically possible. Several interesting results emerge from simulations of the model. Although zoning tends to make the rich community more exclusive, this need not increase the quality of education in the rich community relative to the poor community. Welfare effects are not monotone in income; some lower income individuals benefit and some higher income individuals are made worse off when zoning is introduced.
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Suggested Citation

  • Fernandez, R. & Rogerson, R., 1993. "Keeping People Out: Income Distribution, Zoning and the Quality of Public Education," Papers 19, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:bostec:19
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. J.M. Pogodzinski & Tim R. Sass, 1991. "Measuring the Effects of Municipal Zoning Regulations: A Survey," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 28(4), pages 597-621, August.
    2. Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 1979. "Market models of local government: Exit, voting, and the land market," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 319-337, July.
    3. Roberts, Kevin W. S., 1977. "Voting over income tax schedules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 329-340, December.
    4. Henderson, J Vernon, 1980. "Community Development: The Effects of Growth and Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(5), pages 894-910, December.
    5. Epple, Dennis & Romer, Thomas & Filimon, Radu, 1988. "Community development with endogenous land use controls," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 133-162, March.
    6. de Bartolome, Charles A M, 1990. "Equilibrium and Inefficiency in a Community Model with Peer Group Effects," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 110-133, February.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    education ; income;

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
    • H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education

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