Information Rent and Technology Choice in a Regulated Firm
Regulated firms are not necessarily willing to invest in cost minimizing technologies, but evaluate different technologies according to their impact on the information rent. In a two-type adverse selection model three kinds of investments are considered: investments that increase the probability of having low costs; investments that reduce the cost of low-cost types; and investments that reduce the cost of high-costs types.
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