Property Rights, Incomplete Contracts, and Social Harm
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Tore Ellingsen & Magnus Johannesson, 2004.
"Is There a Hold-up Problem?,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(3), pages 475-494, October.
- Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus, 2000. "Is There a Hold-up Problem?," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 357, Stockholm School of Economics.
More about this item
KeywordsPROPERTY RIGHTS ; EXTERNALITIES ; GAME THEORY;
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
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