IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fth/aunaec/308.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Property Rights and Incomplete Contracts: Dealing with Nuisance

Author

Listed:
  • Pitchford, R.
  • Snyder, C.M.

Abstract

A model of externalities with sequential location choice is developed. The first mover decides on location before it knows the identity of the second mover. Joint location results in a negative externality. The court, having limitd information, allocates property rights over the externality based on the limiting of location. Sufficient conditions are presented supporting the 'coming to the nuisance' dotrine, where the first mover is given property rights. This doctrine is nit always supported: greater surplus may be generated by giving property rights to the second mover. A sufficient condition guaranteeing optimality for any property rights allocation is derived.

Suggested Citation

  • Pitchford, R. & Snyder, C.M., 1996. "Property Rights and Incomplete Contracts: Dealing with Nuisance," Papers 308, Australian National University - Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:aunaec:308
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Joshua S. Gans & Philip L. Williams, 1999. "Access Regulation and the Timing of Infrastructure Investment," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 75(2), pages 127-137, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    PROPERTY RIGHTS; INFORMATION;

    JEL classification:

    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:aunaec:308. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thomas Krichel (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dranuau.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.