Moral Hazard in Teams with Uncertainty, and Transfers of Repetition as Enforcement Mechanisms
Properties of stochastic outcome functions are exploited to solve the moral hazard problem in teams under unobservable individual actions and different individual objectives. Two kinds of enforcement mechanisms are considered: Enforcement through utility transfers and enforcement through repetition. For both more general results are obtained by adapting conditions previously derived to ensure truthful revelation of private information for collective deciSion-making. These conditions are shown to be generic. Also, one of these being weaker than the condition of pairwise identifiability used by Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin, a new Folk theorem is obtained.
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|Date of creation:||1995|
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