Moral Hazard in Teams with Uncertainty, and Transfers of Repetition as Enforcement Mechanisms
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- d ASPREMONT, Claude & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, 1994. "Moral Hazard in Teams with Uncertainty, and Transfers or Repetition as Enforcement Mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers 1994073, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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- GRECO, Luciano, 2003. "Optimal grants under asymmetric information: federalism versus devolution," CORE Discussion Papers 2003024, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
More about this item
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
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