IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cor/louvco/1994073.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Moral Hazard in Teams with Uncertainty, and Transfers or Repetition as Enforcement Mechanisms

Author

Listed:
  • d ASPREMONT, Claude

    (CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)

  • GERARD-VARET, Louis-André

    (G.R.E.Q.A.M., Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Marseille)

Abstract

Properties of stochastic outcome functions are exploited to solve the moral hazard problem in teams under unobservable individual actions and different individual objectives. Two kinds of enforcement mechanisms are considered: Enforcement through utility transfers and enforcement through repetition. For both more general results are obtained by adapting conditions previously derived to ensure truthful revelation of private information for collective deciSion-making. These conditions are shown to be generic. Also, one of these being weaker than the condition of pairwise identifiability used by Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin, a new Folk theorem is obtained.

Suggested Citation

  • d ASPREMONT, Claude & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, 1994. "Moral Hazard in Teams with Uncertainty, and Transfers or Repetition as Enforcement Mechanisms," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1994073, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1994073
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp1994.html
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. GRECO, Luciano, 2003. "Optimal grants under asymmetric information: federalism versus devolution," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2003024, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mechanism design; team moral hazard; folk theorem;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1994073. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Alain GILLIS (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/coreebe.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.