International Emission Trading Systems: Trade Level and Political Acceptability
The Kyoto Protocol of December 1997 allows emission trade between countries that have committed themselves to an emission ceiling. This paper considers two schemes of emission trading: trade between goverments and trade between emision sources. The two schemes are analyzed and the strengths and weaknesses of the two schemes are compared in a public choice setting which focuses on group size, selective incentives, entrepreneurship and lobbyism from industry.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, Faculty of Business Administration. The Aarhus School of Business. Fuglesangs Alle 4. DK- 8210 Aarhus V - Denmark|
Phone: +45 89 486396
Fax: +45 8615 5175
Web page: http://www.asb.dk/about/departments/nat.aspx
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:aascbu:99-11. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.