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Bureaucratic Tax-seeking: The Danish Waste Tax

Author

Listed:
  • Christoffersen, H.
  • Svendsen, G.T.

Abstract

Two main results in traditional tax theory states the following. First, general taxes minimize the welfare loss from changed relative prices. Second, because the total public budget tends to exceed the optimal size, a leader (here named "troop leader") is needed in the budget process to prevent over-taxation. Nevertheless, differentiated taxes initiated by individual ministries generate a still larger proportion of total tax revenue, in particular under cover of taxing externalities such as environmental pollution.

Suggested Citation

  • Christoffersen, H. & Svendsen, G.T., 2000. "Bureaucratic Tax-seeking: The Danish Waste Tax," Papers 00-8, Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:aascbu:00-8
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    Cited by:

    1. Urs Steiner Brandt & Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, 2004. "Rent-Seeking and Grandfathering: The Case of GHG Trade in the Eu," Energy & Environment, , vol. 15(1), pages 69-80, January.
    2. Urs Steiner Brandt & Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, 2003. "Bureaucratic Rent-Seeking in the European Union," Working Papers 46/03, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H0 - Public Economics - - General
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • Q0 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - General

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