Earmarked Taxation for Financing Public Investments Projects
This paper deals with the earmarked taxation employed by local governments for fi nancing public investments projects carried on with some Public-Private Partnerships con figurations. First, we analyse the theoretical pro files of earmarked taxation by using the tax-benefi t approach, and the theory of political competition and accountability. Second, on the ground of the P-P-P literature, we examine the trade-off between fi nancing mechanisms based on public subsidies to the concessionaire fi rm, fi nanced by a earmarked tax, and mechanisms based on users-fees. Then, we discuss cases where the rst solution turns out to be, even partially, preferred. Finally, we consider the potential role of earmarked taxation on the Italian institutional context, emerging from the recent legislation on fi scal federalism and municipalities taxation.
|Date of creation:||2011|
|Date of revision:|
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