IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fgv/epgewp/653.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Inflation targeting, credibility and confidence crises

Author

Listed:
  • Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de
  • Santos, Rafael Chaves

Abstract

We study the interplay between the central bank transparency, its credibility, and the ination target level. Based on a model developed in the spirit of the global games literature, we argue that whenever a weak central bank adopts a high degree of transparency and a low target level, a bad and self conrmed type of equilibrium may arise. In this case, an over-the-target ination becomes more likely. The central bank is considered weak when favorable state of nature is required for the target to be achieved. On the other hand, if a weak central bank opts for less ambitious goals, namely lower degree of transparency and higher target level, it may avoid condence crises and ensure a unique equilibrium for the expected ination. Moreover, even after ruling out the possibility of condence crises, less ambitious goals may be desirable in order to attain higher credibility and hence a better coordination of expectations. Conversely, a low target level and a high central bank transparency are desirable whenever the economy has strong fundamentals and the target can be fullled in many states of nature.

Suggested Citation

  • Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de & Santos, Rafael Chaves, 2007. "Inflation targeting, credibility and confidence crises," FGV/EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 653, FGV/EPGE - Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  • Handle: RePEc:fgv:epgewp:653
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace/bitstream/10438/432/1/2226.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Solange Gouvea, 2007. "Price Rigidity in Brazil: Evidence from CPI Micro Data," Working Papers Series 143, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
    2. Ricardo Schechtman, 2017. "Joint Validation of Credit Rating PDs under Default Correlation," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 13(2), pages 235-282, June.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fgv:epgewp:653. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Núcleo de Computação da FGV/EPGE). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/epgvfbr.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.