Public Security vs. Private Self-Protection: Optimal Taxation and the Social Dynamics of Fear
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KeywordsSelf-Protection; Fear of Crime; Cultural Selection Dynamics; Replicator Dynamics;
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- K49 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Other
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