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When Inertia Generates Political Cycles

Author

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  • Raphäel Soubeyran

    (GREQAM)

Abstract

We propose a simple infinite horizon of repeated elections with two candidates. Furthermore we suppose that the government policy presents some degree of inertia, i.e. a new government cannot completely change the policy implemented by the incumbent. When the policy inertia is strong enough, no party can win the election a consecutive infinite number of times.

Suggested Citation

  • Raphäel Soubeyran, 2006. "When Inertia Generates Political Cycles," Working Papers 2006.91, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  • Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2006.91
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    Cited by:

    1. Nicolas Houy, 2007. "When inertia generates political cycles: a remark," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(16), pages 1-5.
    2. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2007:i:16:p:1-5 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political Cycles; Inertia;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

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