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When inertia generates political cycles: a remark

Author

Listed:
  • Nicolas Houy

    (Thema, Université de Cergy-Pontoise)

Abstract

We show how introducing a time discount factor can strengthen some results given in [Soubeyran R. (2006) "When Inertia Generates Political Cycles," Economics Bulletin, Vol. 4 no. 31 pp. 1-8.].

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Houy, 2007. "When inertia generates political cycles: a remark," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(16), pages 1-5.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-07d70002
    as

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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2007/Volume4/EB-07D70002A.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Raphäel Soubeyran, 2006. "When Inertia Generates Political Cycles," Working Papers 2006.91, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    2. Raphaël Soubeyran, 2006. "When Inertia Generates Political Cycles," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(31), pages 1-8.
    3. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2006:i:31:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Soubeyran, Raphael, 2006. "When Inertia Generates Political Cycles," Privatisation Regulation Corporate Governance Working Papers 12192, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
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    Cited by:

    1. Raphaël Soubeyran & Pascal Gautier, 2008. "Political Cycles: Issue Ownership and the Opposition Advantage," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(4), pages 685-716, August.

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    1. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2007:i:16:p:1-5 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Raphaël Soubeyran & Pascal Gautier, 2008. "Political Cycles: Issue Ownership and the Opposition Advantage," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(4), pages 685-716, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Inertia;

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

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