Taxation and the Control of International Oligopoly
The paper shows how the differing incidence of specific and ad valorem taxation in imperfectly competitive markest can be exploited to control international oligopoly. If countries act cooperatively, the tax instruments used in combination achieve the same outcome, either the first-best or the constrained second-best, as direct production control. When a single country regulates the oligopoly, circumstances are shown to exist in which taxation is superior to production control.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1995|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (01392) 263218
Fax: (01392) 263242
Web page: http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/about/departments/economics/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:exe:wpaper:9506. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Carlos Cortinhas)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.