Voting and Decisions in the ECB
This paper analyses the interaction between decisions on monetary policy in the future European Central Bank and different voting mechanisms. Using a simple stochastic model for preferences over monetary policy it is shown that the voting mechanism described in the actual statute leads to inefficient outcomes. The paper shows as well that the inefficiency can be resolved by allowing for sidepayments. The optimal monetary policy can be implemented by a noncooperative bargaining game.
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|Date of creation:||1997|
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