How do subjects assess the Social Trade-off invilved in the Prisoners' Dilemma?
In this paper we obtain the value that experimental subjects attach to a prisoners’ dilemma game by applying a related procedure to BDM (1964). We also obtain the value of a closely related game which does not incorporate any social dilemma. By comparing both values, we are able to classify subjects in di.erent categories: (i) 16% of the subjects responded to the social dilemma by playing the cooperative strategy, (ii) The remaining subjects (84%) did not played the cooperative strategy and moreover, 53% of the subjects behaved as if the social dilemma was not an issue at all.
|Date of creation:||2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.d-andalucia.csic.es/iesa.htm|
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:esa:iesawp:0407. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Luis Miguel Miller)The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Luis Miguel Miller to update the entry or send us the correct email address
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.