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Feeding the Leviathan

Author

Listed:
  • Pablo Guillén

    ()

  • Christiane Schwieren
  • Gianandrea Staffiero

Abstract

Using a step-level public good game, we analyze the e.ects on contributions of having played under a sanctioning regime. We find that "educational" effects, in terms of learning a particular way to coordinate towards "good" equilibria, are more relevant than motivational "crowding out" effects, whereby cooperating to avoid sanctions spoils intrinsic incentives. If groups vote, they decide to remove the costly sanctioning regime; then they cooperate as much as in automatic removal only when this decision entails a clear "trust" message.

Suggested Citation

  • Pablo Guillén & Christiane Schwieren & Gianandrea Staffiero, 2004. "Feeding the Leviathan," IESA Working Papers Series 0404, Institute for Social Syudies of Andalusia - Higher Council for Scientific Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:esa:iesawp:0404
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    File URL: http://www.avantine.com/iesa/control/upfiles/leviathan.pdf
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    Keywords

    Public Good; Step-level; Sanctioning Institution; Cooperation; Education; Trust;

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