Financial Repression, Selective Credits and Endogenous Growth: Orthodoxy and Heresy
In the current orthodoxy it is argued that financial repression is a result of government behavior which aims at obtaining low-cost funds from the financial market. Selective credit policies are seen as a component of financial repression. Further, in this orthodoxy, it is argued that financial repression hinders growth and hence ought to be eliminated. This prescription also advises the abolishment of selective credit mechanisms. In this paper, a simple two-sector model is set up in order to show that governments may institute selective credit policies to internalize existing positive production and investment externalities. It is shown that such a policy is welfare-improving in the context of the model assumptions and that abolishment of selective credits may cause welfare losses. The model also provides a case where financial policy is designed according to the priorities of industrial policy.
|Date of creation:||Feb 1996|
|Date of revision:||Feb 1996|
|Publication status:||Published by The Economic Research Forum (ERF)|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 21 Al-Sad Al Aaly St. Dokki, Giza|
Web page: http://www.erf.org.eg
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