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Increase-Decrease Game under Imperfect Competition in Two-stage Zonal Power Markets – Part I: Concept Analysis

Author

Listed:
  • M. Sarfati

    (Electricity Market Research Group (EMReG), KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden - Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Sweden)

  • M.R. Hesamzadeh

    (Electricity Market Research Group (EMReG), KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden.)

  • P. Holmberg

    (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Sweden -Energy Policy Research Group (EPRG), University of Cambridge, UK -Program on Energy and Sustainable Development (PESD), Stanford University, CA, USA)

Abstract

This paper is part I of a two-part paper. It proposes a two-stage game to analyze imperfect competition of producers in zonal power markets with a day-ahead and a real-time market. We consider strategic producers in both markets. They need to take both markets into account when deciding what to bid in each market. The demand shocks between these markets are modeled by several scenarios. The two-stage game is formulated as a Twostage Stochastic Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (TS-EPEC). Then it is further reformulated as a two-stage stochastic Mixed-Integer Linear Program (MILP). The solution of this MILP gives the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE). To tackle multiple SPNE, we design a procedure which _nds all SPNE with di_erent total dispatch costs. The proposed MILP model is solved using Benders decomposition embedded in the CPLEX solver. The proposed MILP model is demonstrated on the 6-node and the IEEE 30-node example systems.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • M. Sarfati & M.R. Hesamzadeh & P. Holmberg, 2018. "Increase-Decrease Game under Imperfect Competition in Two-stage Zonal Power Markets – Part I: Concept Analysis," Working Papers EPRG 1837, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
  • Handle: RePEc:enp:wpaper:eprg1837
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dijk, Justin & Willems, Bert, 2011. "The effect of counter-trading on competition in electricity markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 1764-1773, March.
    2. Bjorndal, Mette & Jornsten, Kurt, 2007. "Benefits from coordinating congestion management--The Nordic power market," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 1978-1991, March.
    3. Richard Green, 2007. "Nodal pricing of electricity: how much does it cost to get it wrong?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 125-149, April.
    4. Pär Holmberg and Ewa Lazarczyk, 2015. "Comparison of congestion management techniques: Nodal, zonal and discriminatory pricing," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2).
    5. Hesamzadeh, Mohammad Reza & Holmberg, Pär & Sarfati, Mahir, 2018. "Simulation and Evaluation of Zonal Electricity Market Designs," Working Paper Series 1211, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    6. Blaise Allaz & Jean-Luc Vila, 1993. "Cournot Competition, Forward Markets and Efficiency," Post-Print hal-00511806, HAL.
    7. Ruderer, D., 2012. "The Impact of Transmission Pricing in Network Industries," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1230, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    8. Karsten Neuhoff & Benjamin F. Hobbs & David Newbery, 2011. "Congestion Management in European Power Networks: Criteria to Assess the Available Options," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1161, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sarfati, M. & Hesamzadeh, M-R. & Holmberg, P., 2019. "Production efficiency of nodal and zonal pricing in imperfectly competitive electricity markets," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1919, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    2. Holmberg, Pär & Tangerås, Thomas & Ahlqvist, Victor, 2018. "Central- versus Self-Dispatch in Electricity Markets," Working Paper Series 1257, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 27 Mar 2019.
    3. Erik Heilmann & Nikolai Klempp & Kai Hufendiek & Heike Wetzel, 2022. "Long-term Contracts for Network-supportive Flexibility in Local Flexibility Markets," MAGKS Papers on Economics 202224, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Two-stage game; Zonal pricing; Two-stage equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints; Wholesale electricity market;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities

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