Principles for benchmarking potentially alternative systems of private copy compensation
Current theory provides no clear framework for the analysis of the current system of private copy compensation and its potential modifications and/or alternatives. Building upon more general incentive economics theory and on general legal considerations, this paper attempts to build such analytical framework by proposing a set of principles for benchmarking potentially alternative systems of private copy compensation. The paper also offers a brief analysis of the main modifications and alternatives to the current system in light of the abovementioned principles. The main finding is that, according to the proposed principles, the current system "as is" gets the best appraisal.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2007|
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- Hal R. Varian, 2005. "Copying and Copyright," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(2), pages 121-138, Spring.
- Landes, William M & Posner, Richard A, 1989. "An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(2), pages 325-63, June.
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